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Abstract
To make predictions with theories, usually we assume an individual's char-
acteristics such as uncertainty preferences to be stable over time. In this
paper, we analyze the stability of ambiguity preferences experimentally.
We repeatedly elicit ambiguity attitudes towards multiple 3-color Ellsberg
urns over a period of two months. In our data, 57% of the choices are con-
sistent with stable preferences over the time of observation. This share is
signiﬁcantly higher than random choices would suggest, but signiﬁcantly
lower than the level of consistency in a control treatment without a time
lag (71%). Interestingly, for subjects who are able to recall their decision
after two months correctly, the share of consistent choices does not drop
signiﬁcantly over time.
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1 Introduction
People who prefer alternatives with known probabilities over alternatives with
unknown probabilities are ambiguity averse. In his seminal paper, Ellsberg
(1961) described a thought experiment designed to test an individual's ambi-
guity aversion. Since then, the topic has received considerable attention in the
literature (Etner et al. 2012). The thought experiment has been conducted
many times with real subjects and incentives (see Camerer and Weber 1992 or
Trautmann and Kuilen 2013). The usual result is that a majority of subjects are
indeed ambiguity averse. As a consequence, ambiguity is taken into account to
better explain real world phenomena and to make better predictions. Increas-
ingly, ambiguity aversion models are applied to economic problems such as the
stock market (Epstein and Schneider 2008) or climate change (see Weitzman
2009 or Millner et al. 2012).
In any model that makes predictions based on preferences, an often unmen-
tioned, but important assumption is the stability of said preferences. To draw
conclusions from previous observations to future behavior, we have to assume
that the person considered chooses according to the same rules at both points
in time. When designing policies, for example in the context of the choice of
pension plans or climate protection, we can only observe choices today while the
payoﬀs realize in the future, often involving uncertainty. While the literature
provides some insights into the stability of risk preferences (Zeisberger et al.
2012), it is mainly quiet with respect to ambiguity attitudes. The scarcity of
real life choice situations with precise probabilities stresses the importance of
an extension of the analysis to preferences on ambiguity. While it is impossi-
ble to directly read out the preferences from the subjects mind, we compare
behavior across multiple choice conditions. If subjects possess preferences for
ambiguity, and if those preferences are stable, we would expect choices to be
consistent. That is, we would expect subjects who chose ambiguity averse in
one condition to be ambiguity averse in a second condition as well.
To test ambiguity aversion, we use a standard tool of the ambiguity literature,
the Ellsberg 3-color urn. One potential worry when testing the consistency of
preferences is that subjects might have preferences that are stable, but diﬀer
across diﬀerent urns. To apply the strictest possible test, we use a design that
allows us to obtain two measures of ambiguity aversion for one and the same,
physically identical, urn.
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In our main experiment, we study the stability of choices over a period of two
months using the standard design. In addition, we also look at two variations
with a shorter time lag. In one, we reduce the time delay between the ﬁrst
choice and the second choice to a few minutes only. In the second variation,
choices are again made with a delay of a few minutes, but in one choice, payoﬀs
are in the present and in the other choice, payoﬀ are in the future.
Overall, we ﬁnd that individual choices are more stable than random choices
would suggest. However, far from all subjects are consistent across all choices.
Moving payoﬀs to the future does not signiﬁcantly impact stability, but sepa-
rating choices by two months' time leads to lower consistency. We even ﬁnd
reduced consistency when moving from back-to-back decisions to decisions that
are taken roughly 10 minutes apart. Interestingly, for subjects recalling their
choices after two months, we do not ﬁnd time eﬀects on stability.
In section 2, we brieﬂy review the related literature whereas section 3 explains
the experimental design. In section 4 and 5 we present the results of our exper-
iment. Finally section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
There is a large number of studies that address the general question of pref-
erence stability. With respect to preferences on uncertainty, the majority of
papers deals with expected utility theory and prospect theory (see Zeisberger
et al. 2012) for a more detailed survey on this literature). In one of the ﬁrst
studies on individual stability, Wehrung et al. (1984) elicits hypothetical in-
vestment decisions of 90 business executives twice, where the second elicitation
is one year later. They ﬁnd a small but highly signiﬁcant positive correlation
(ρ = 0.36) for the personal risk measures. Smidts (1997) assumes constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) and compares the estimated parameters at two
diﬀerent points in time. He asked Dutch farmers for certainty equivalents for
50/50 lotteries (midpoint chaining technique) concerning the market price for
potatoes. He observes an even stronger correlation (ρ = 0.44) for the Arrow-
Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion after one year. Harrison et al. (2005)
conduct lab experiments and compare risk preferences according to the Holt and
Laury (2002) framework at two diﬀerent points in time. By using a structural
maximum likelihood model, they estimate CRRA coeﬃcients and do not ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of the aggregate parameter after 20 to 28 weeks. Note,
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however, that they do not study individual stability. Andersen et al. (2008)
elicit risk preferences over a 17-month period from a representative sample of
the adult Danish population, using four diﬀerent elicitation tasks. They ﬁnd
a positive and signiﬁcant correlation (ρ = 0.34 to ρ = 0.58, depending on the
actual task), but do not identify a general tendency for risk attitudes to change
over time. In a related paper, Baucells and Villasís (2010) study the stability
of risk preferences in a prospect theory framework. They analyze risk aversion
both in gains and losses. They observe a stable pattern of preferences on the
aggregate level, while the percentage of individuals that change their responses
across sessions is quite high (63%).
There are only few studies that address the stability of ambiguity aversion.
None of them systematically studies identical situations over distinct points in
time. Eliaz and Ortoleva (2012) elicit multiple ambiguous decisions, one deci-
sion appears three times. Here, 71% of subjects give consistent answers while
the remaining 29% change their view when faced with the decision for the sec-
ond or third time.1 However, there is no variation in the time dimension. There
are some recent papers that test for the stability of ambiguity aversion across
diﬀerent choice situations. Stahl (2013) compares the two classical Ellsberg urn
variants ﬁnding a lower number of ambiguity averse subjects in the 3-color-urn
(55%) than in the 2-color-urn (70%). Moreover, he shows that the number of
ambiguity averse choices drops as the relative payoﬀs of the ambiguous urn rises.
Based on the observed choices in these diﬀerent situations, he comes up with
a classiﬁcation of individual behavior. He reports 60% subjects to be choosing
almost random, while 26% of choice patterns are consistent with expected
utility and only 12% represent ambiguity averse choices. Binmore et al. (2012)
also analyze decision behavior in diﬀerent conditions and test the explanatory
power of diﬀerent theories. They ﬁnd only weak evidence for consistent ambi-
guity aversion and explain this result by a stricter consistency requirement as
they analyze two diﬀerent (but related) comparisons in choices. Dimmock et al.
(2011) compare ambiguity attitudes from diﬀerent elicitation tasks and found
at least 35% inconsistent classiﬁcations across the tasks.
1In the experimental literature on ambiguity aversion, broader classiﬁcations (averse, neu-
tral, loving) are more common than the estimation of a more speciﬁc parameter, which makes
the use of a correlation coeﬃcient less meaningful.
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3 Design
The experiment is designed as a sequence of two parts to measure ambiguity
preferences of the same subjects at two points in time. The ﬁrst part of ex-
perimental sessions took place in November 2012 (November sessions) while
the second part took place in January 2013 (January sessions). The time lag
between the two parts varies from 47 to 59 days depending on the session the
subject was assigned to. All sessions took place in the AWI lab at Heidelberg
University. Subjects were recruited via the local ORSEE platform (Greiner
2004) and were informed in the invitation that the experiment would consist of
two parts. To increase retention in the second part, we oﬀered a e4 show up
fee and fourteen diﬀerent time slots in January for which the subjects received
up to three invitation e-mails.
The experiment was executed in a paper and pencil design. The complete in-
structions were distributed at the beginning of each session and remained with
the subjects for the whole experiment. All random draws were conducted with
physical devices (boxes with marbles/a coin) and in the presence of the subjects.
3.1 Ambiguity measure
We elicit ambiguity preferences by using a 3-color urn as proposed by Ellsberg
(1961). Consider an urn containing thirty balls. Ten balls are yellow (Y ). The
remaining twenty balls are either green (G) or blue (B) balls in an unknown
distribution. In order to elicit the preferences, the subject faces two bets. For
each bet the experimenters randomly draw a ball from the urn.2 If the subject's
bet coincides with the draw we pay e4 and otherwise e0. In the ﬁrst bet the
subject faces two possible choices: either to bet on Y or to bet on B. In the
second bet the subject bets either on Y or G or on B or G. The above choices
translate into ambiguity preferences according to table 1.
Ambiguity preference Averse Neutral Neutral Loving
Bet 1 Y Y B B
Bet 2 B or G Y or G B or G Y or G
Table 1: Classiﬁcation of choices
2After each draw the ball is returned to the urn.
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Note that there are no beliefs that justify strictly preferring Y in bet 1 and B
or G in bet 2 under the assumption of expected utility maximizing behavior.
Rather, by preferring Y over B and B or G over Y or G a subject opts for
choices with a known number of balls over choices where the number of winning
balls is ambiguous. Such a subject is called ambiguity averse. Analogously,
preferring B over Y in bet 1 and Y or G over B or G in bet 2 is called
ambiguity loving. Finally, Y and Y or G as well as B and B or G are the
only choice combinations for which probability distributions of beliefs exist that
satisfy subjective expected utility theory. Subjects showing this behavior are
hence classiﬁed as ambiguity neutral.
Indiﬀerence The 3-color urn is not able to identify subjects who are indif-
ferent in any bet. To tackle this issue, we add two non-incentivized questions
to each bet. The questions are non-incentivized in order to exclude any pos-
sibility of hedging and to maintain the incentive-compatibility of the 3-color
urn. In a ﬁrst step, we follow Dominiak et al. (2012) and ask subjects about
her conﬁdence when making the bet.3 This conﬁdence measure ranges from
not conﬁdent at all to very conﬁdent on a ﬁve point Likert-scale (denomi-
nated as conﬁdence henceforth). Furthermore, we elicit a subject's hypothetical
willingness to change the bet to the other choice (henceforth WTA).4
3.2 Main experiment
After discussing our measure for ambiguity preferences we explain the course of
actions in the experiment. As pointed out above, the experiment is designed to
measure ambiguity preferences at diﬀerent points in time. When comparing a
subject's decisions in the 3-color urn at two points in time, changes in behavior
could stem from two diﬀerent reasons: First, the subject could evaluate bets
diﬀerently, because she is faced with a diﬀerent urn and could therefore reason-
ably expect the two urns to be diﬀerent. Second, even if the subject assumes the
urns to be similar, her behavior in face of the same object might have changed.
We want to measure changes and stability of ambiguity preferences. It is there-
3The exact wording is How conﬁdent (from not conﬁdent at all to very conﬁdent) are
you with this decision?.
4The exact wording in the instructions is: You will be paid-oﬀ accordingly to your decision
above. But, hypothetically asked, how much should we pay you such that you change your
decision above? The answers are scaled from e0 to e4.
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Figure 1: Course of actions
fore the second eﬀect that we what to insulate. Changes in behavior should not
be due to a change in the urn which is evaluated. That is, we want subjects
to make multiple decisions for a physically identical urn. In the following we
describe an incentive compatible mechanism that elicits ambiguity preferences
on the physically identical urn twice. Additionally, by eliciting the ambiguity
attitudes towards two urns in each choice condition, we are not only able to
make statements on the stability of preferences across time but also within the
smallest time interval possible: in two back-to-back decisions.
Procedures When investigating the impact of time on preferences we diﬀer-
entiate between three types of decisions (consider ﬁgure 1). First, a choice is
made today and the payoﬀ consequences of the choice are realized today (choice:
present, payoﬀ: present; henceforth P). Second, a choice is made today but the
realization of the consequence takes place in the future (choice: present, payoﬀ:
future; henceforth PF ). Finally, a choice is made in the future and the realiza-
tion of the consequence takes place in the future (choice: future, payoﬀ: future;
henceforth F ). Note that the F problem is structurally equivalent with the P
problem but in a later point of time. Hence, the comparison of P and F is a
natural comparison when investigating the stability of preferences over time.
Choice conditions Present (P): In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, in P,
we elicit the subject's ambiguity preferences for two urns. Choices and payoﬀ
happen in the same session. Therefore these urns are denoted as P1 and P2.
However, after collecting the decision sheets, a coin is ﬂipped and only one urn
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is paid out.5 Under this condition subjects make a decision in the present for
the present.
Present - Future (PF ): One urn from the P condition is not paid out. This urn
is used again in PF, together with a new urn. Again, subjects make choices for
these two urns. However, the payoﬀ of this second round of choices is postponed
to the November sessions of the experiment in January. Therefore, the choice is
made in present but the payoﬀ is in the future. These urns are denominated as
PF1 and PF2. Again, after making the choices, the decision sheets are collected
and a coin ﬂip decides which of the two PF urns is paid oﬀ. Note, by moving
an urn from P to PF we are able to observe incentive compatible choices for
the physically identical urn under P and PF.
Future (F ): The F choice condition takes place during the January sessions of
the experiment (F ) two months after the P and PF conditions. The non-paid
urn from PF is used again for the F condition. Additionally, a new urn is
brought in. These urns are denoted as F1 and F2. When subjects have to
make their choices, the decision sheets are collected. Again a coin ﬂip decides
which of the urns is paid out. By moving an urn from P to F we observe
choices of a physically identical urn in P and F. Depending on the coin ﬂips
it is also possible to observe decisions for the physically identical urn under all
three conditions. From a point of view of the November session, this decision
can be considered to be made in the future for the future. However, taking the
position of the January session, the F decision is comparable to the P decision
as in both decisions choice and payoﬀ take place in the same session.
Randomization In order to control for order eﬀects within the November
sessions, we counterbalanced the order in which subjects received the conditions
P and PF.6
Credibility Since we elicit the ambiguity on a physically identical urn twice,
a major concern is that subjects have to trust the experimenters that urns are
not tampered. To tackle this issue, we take pictures of the urns in front of the
subjects. Each picture carries a physical and unique time stamp. After ﬁnishing
5Subjects are informed about the complete structure of the design at the begin of each
session.
6Note that the randomization procedure also aﬀects the urn that is moved between the
diﬀerent conditions. In standard order, a P urn is moved to PF and a PF urn is moved to
F. In reversed order, a PF urn is moved to P and a P urn is moved to F.
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the experiment, all pictures are sent out to the subjects to verify that the urns
have remained the same when moved between choice conditions.7
3.3 Treatment single session
In order to establish a strict test for the time eﬀect, we run also a between
subject treatment comparable to the main experiment but omitting the time
lag of two months. Applying the above coin ﬂip procedure, we elicit ambiguity
attitudes four times in a single session.
Figure 2: Single session: Course of actions
The structure is similar to the main experiment. First, we elicit ambiguity
preferences on two urns denoted by P1 and P2 (see ﬁgure 2). After the decision
is made, a coin ﬂip decides which urn is paid out. The urn not chosen for
payment is moved to the next choice condition P' which is identical to the ﬁrst
condition P : again, both choices and payoﬀs are realized today. P' represents
a second elicitation of immediately paid choices and hence replaces F from the
main experiment.8 However, in contrast to the main experiment, between P
and P' approximately ten minutes elapse whereas between P and F there is a
time span of two months. Therefore, comparing consistency levels between P
and P' to those between P and F in the main experiment serves as a test for
the eﬀect of time.
7Examples for these pictures can be found in the appendix.
8Note that in single session there is no counterpart to the PF condition with deferred
payments as all choices and payments take place in the same session.
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3.4 Further measures
We elicit several additional variables to control for their potential impact on
ambiguity preferences and their temporal stability.
Risk preferences In both experiments, after eliciting the ambiguity prefer-
ences, subjects complete a risk preference measure in a multiple price list design
(Holt and Laury 2002). Each subject is asked to take ten decisions on paired
lotteries (option A and option B). From the ﬁrst to the tenth decision, the ex-
pected value of both lotteries is increasing while option A has a lower variance
for all decisions. Therefore, the subject faces a trade-oﬀ between variance and
expected earnings. A subject with monotone and rational preferences starts
choosing option A and switches to option B if the marginal willingness to ac-
cept risk is reached. A random draw determines one of the ten decisions which
is paid out. Eliciting the risk preference in P and in F allows us to compare
the stability of risk preferences to the stability of ambiguity preferences. In the
following we refer to this elicitation mechanism as the HL task.
Time preferences Moreover, in the November sessions, subjects are given a
choice list that involves deferred payoﬀs (see ﬁgure 3). Option A pays e2 at
date P for all ten decisions. Option B is paid out in the January sessions with
payoﬀs ranging from e2 in the ﬁrst decision to e3 in the tenth decision. A
random draw chooses one payoﬀ relevant decision. Any subject who discounts
the future chooses option A in the ﬁrst decision. Depending on their time
preference, they will switch to B in later rows, or even stay with A all along for
extreme time preferences.
Figure 3: Elicitation of time preferences
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Sociodemographic information In both experiments, as a last task, we sur-
vey sociodemographic information of the subjects including gender, age, body
height, studentship and whether statistics, econometrics, or game theory classes
had been taken.
Recall questions In the January sessions, two urns of the November sessions
play a role: The PF urn which is chosen for payment and - depending on the
order - the PF or P urn which was moved to the F condition (see ﬁgure 1).
Therefore, in January, we elicit a subject's ability to recall the choices made in
the November session. This task is incentivized as we pay e0.25 for each choice
that is recalled correctly.
4 Main results
4.1 General information
In the November sessions of the main experiment 110 subjects participated of
which 105 returned to the January sessions which amounts to a retention rate
of 95%.9 In the single session experiment 35 subjects participated. Fourteen
subjects participated in both experiments.10 The sample is balanced on gender
(51% males) while 95% of the subjects are students. The average payoﬀ was
e6.87 in November, e17.34 in January and e13.44 in the single session treat-
ment.
Averaged over all ambiguity tasks, we ﬁnd 53.7% ambiguity averse, 37.4% neu-
tral and 9.9% ambiguity loving choices. These numbers are in line with results
other studies have found before (see Camerer and Weber 1992 or Oechssler and
Roomets 2013).
In terms of recall capacity, we ﬁnd 58.1% of the subjects remembering their
preferences for the payoﬀ relevant PF urn correctly (recall henceforth). This
share is higher than in the case of random answers (N=103, p <0.001, binomial
9Due a mistake in the instructions we had to drop ten observations in one session. Other
observations are dropped on a case by case basis for some tests when decision sheets or
questionnaires were returned incomplete.
10We invited subjects from single session to the main experiment with the intention of
creating within subject comparisons. Due to the low rate of retention from single session
to the main experiment, we drop this analysis. We successfully added additional incentives
to increase subject retention in the main experiment. In the regressions, we cluster on the
subject level.
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test) and shows that subjects were able to recall their previous answers.11
4.2 Descriptives: consistency
Our main interest is the share of consistent choices with respect to the revealed
ambiguity attitude. We deﬁne two choices to be consistent if they reveal the
same ambiguity attitude in two diﬀerent choice situations.12
Figure 4 shows the consistency levels for choices when comparing diﬀerent situ-
ations (e.g. PF-F compares condition PF with condition F ). Here, we discuss
diﬀerences in consistency while econometric tests are provided in the next sec-
tion.
Figure 4: Consistency over choice conditions
Last four bars: dark (light) bars for subjects that recall correctly (incorrectly). 2 months
etc.: time lag between decisions.
11For the remainder of the paper we focus on the recall of the PF urn given its payoﬀ
relevance. In the other recall task, subjects performed similarly. 52.5% remember their
preferences of the P urn that is moved to January. Also here, this share is statistically
diﬀerent from 25% which should be expected for random answers (N=59, p <0.001, binomial
test). Moreover, the correlation between both measures turns out to be ρ = 0.48.
12Note that there are two diﬀerent choice combinations which are classiﬁed as ambiguity
neutral (see table 1). For being consistent we do not require the same choices but the same
preferences in two conditions.
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First, note that our subjects are in general more consistent than one would
expect under random choice (37.5%, bar random). However, they are also
not fully consistent in their choices. Consistency varies with the time interval
between decisions. Deferring the payoﬀs is less relevant for consistency.
Moreover, we can compare choices with diﬀerent time lags. Here, the main
diﬀerence is between decisions taken in the same session, with a delay of 10
minutes, and those taken in two diﬀerent sessions, with a two months lag in
between. For the longer time lag we compare decisions in the November session
with the decisions taken in the January session. Here, we ﬁnd low levels of
consistency represented by the bars PF-F (51%) and P-F (57%).
The level of consistency is higher when we consider decisions taken only 10
minutes apart. Bar P-PF depicts the consistency levels across decisions taken
during the November session (69%). A second within session measure, bar P-P',
comes from the single session treatment and shows a very simliar level (71%).
Last we can analyze a third, even shorter time lag between decisions in the
experiment. Remember that, in each choice condition, we asked subjects to
state their preferences for two Ellsberg urns. This was done on a single decision
sheet. That is, these decisions where taking back-to-back without any time
delay.13 For back-to-back decisions we ﬁnd even higher levels of consistency
(bar same condition14, 79%). It seems that even a small time delay between
decisions reduces consistency in behavior.
A very good predictor of consistent decision making is the subjects' ability to
recall their previous decisions after two months. Bars recall PF and recall P-PF
report the consistency levels for PF-F, P-F and P-PF when splitting the sample
in subjects who remember their previous decision (light bars) and subjects who
do not (dark bars). Recall ability especially aﬀects consistency in decisions with
2 months time delay. Subjects who, after 2 months, do not recall their previous
decisions, have a consistency level similar to random behavior.
4.3 Econometric analysis
Data structure and consistency measures Before presenting the econo-
metric results, we brieﬂy describe the data structure. When assessing the con-
sistency of choices in two conditions, we need to keep in mind that the subjects
13Since subjects could change their ﬁrst urn decisions after answering for the second urn,
one could also argue that the decisions where simultaneous.
14Pooled over all conditions (P, PF, F, P' ).
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Figure 5: Data structure
were asked to decide for two Ellsberg urns in each condition. Hence, denot-
ing the two conditions A and B, this involves four urns: A1, A2, B1 and B2.
Therefore, there are four possible comparisons between A and B corresponding
to the horizontal and diagonal arrows in ﬁgure 5. We use all of these four com-
parisons in our regressions. That is, for each subject and each combination of
conditions, we have four observations of the dependent variable consistent, set
to 1 if the revealed ambiguity attitudes for the two corresponding urns coincide
and 0 otherwise.
Further, our experimental design guarantees that subsequent choice conditions
always share one identical urn (compare ﬁgures 1 and 2). Therefore, when
comparing subsequent choice conditions, one out of the four arrows in ﬁgure
5 represents a comparison of decisions for a physically identical urn.15 In this
case, the dummy variable ident is equal to 1. The dummy variable reverse order
is set to one if PF choices were elicited ﬁrst to counterbalance the order in the
November sessions. Finally, we can compare the ambiguity attitude between
the two urns within one condition (the vertical arrows in ﬁgure 5). These de-
cisions are not part of comparisons across conditions. Instead, they form the
comparison group same condition.
All consistency comparisons are necessarily within subject. We can compare
conditions P to F, P to PF and PF to F, since subjects made decisions for all
three cases P, F and PF. Hence, we gain multiple observations for each subject.
As the independent unit of observation is the subject in the regression models
below, we cluster standard errors on the subject level.16
An exception is the treatment single session, which was done as a diﬀerent
experiment and therefore provides an across subject comparison. Here we eval-
uate the diﬀerences between P and P' (ﬁgure 2). Since most subjects in single
15Note that it is possible that the urn that is moved from the ﬁrst to the second condition
is there selected for payoﬀ. In this case, we do not observe a choice for physically identical
urns in all three conditions.
16The results are qualitatively robust when using random eﬀects models for the estimation.
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session did not participate in the main experiment we do not calculate consis-
tency levels relative to conditions from the main experiment.
As a robustness check, in section 5.1, we deﬁne consistency as having the same
ambiguity attitude in all four urns (that is, being consistent along all arrows in
ﬁgure 5 connecting A and B). In this stronger form of consistency, we can no
longer consider same condition separately from the comparisons across condi-
tions.
Regressions We begin by testing whether subjects behave more consistent
than under random choice. Since there are four possible choice patterns for
each urn (one ambiguity averse, one ambiguity loving, two ambiguity neutral,
see section 3.1), we would expect a consistency level of 37.5% if choices were
random. We use a binomial test to compare behavior to this benchmark. It
rejects random behavior at the 0.1% level (N=1800, p <0.001). We receive a
similar result when testing consistency against random behavior for each condi-
tion comparison separately. Even in our comparison with the lowest consistency
level, in bar PF-F, we reject random behavior (N=416, p <0.001).17
We test for diﬀerences in consistency levels across time lags via the regressions
in table 2. In a probit model, with standard errors clustered on subjects, we
explain consistent behavior, coded as a binary variable. Independent variables
in our main model (1) are dummy variables representing diﬀerent pairs of choice
conditions PF-F, P-PF, P-P' and same condition. The omitted category is P-
F. We add the ident dummy to test the eﬀect of being consistent across two
decisions for a physically identical urn whereas the reverse order dummy ac-
counts for a possible order eﬀect.
The signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients conﬁrms the visual impressions from the pre-
vious chapter. P-F and PF-F both feature a time lag of two months and are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. However, P-F is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
both from comparisons with a time lag of 10 minutes (at 1% level comparing to
P-PF and at 5% level comparing to P-P' ) and from the comparisons without
a time lag (0.1% level comparing to same condition). We run additional Wald
tests (see table 7 in the appendix) to test the non-omitted categories against
each other. We ﬁnd a similar result as for P-F for the second condition with a
17These results are robust when testing each choice condition separately on a subject level.
Only when conditioning on recall abilities we cannot always reject random behavior: Con-
sistency levels of subjects who cannot remember their earlier decisions were not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from random for comparisons PF-F (N=174, p=0.21) and P-F (N=174, p=0.10).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P-F omitted PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS PROBIT PROBIT
RECALL RECALL
Dep. Var. consistent consistent consistent consistent consistent consistent
PF-F -0.13 -0.12 -0.056 -0.05 -0.29* -0.31*
0.072 0.077 0.029 0.03 0.13 0.14
P-PF 0.35** 0.35** 0.13** 0.12* 0.41 0.42
0.13 0.13 0.047 0.049 0.21 0.23
P-P' 0.47* 0.48* 0.15** 0.14*
0.19 0.22 0.056 0.065
same condition 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.61*** 0.66**
0.11 0.12 0.037 0.04 0.19 0.2
recall P-F 0.59** 0.67**
0.2 0.21
recall PF-F 0.81*** 0.96***
0.2 0.2
recall P-PF 0.48* 0.57*
0.21 0.23
recall same condition 0.45* 0.52*
0.19 0.2
ident -0.044 -0.0074 -0.016 -0.00049 -0.057 -0.025
0.072 0.073 0.027 0.027 0.082 0.083
reverse order 0.045 0.017 -0.095
0.15 0.055 0.16
HL -0.027 -0.012 -0.13
0.36 0.13 0.37
HL_missing 0.026 0.0093 0.016
0.045 0.016 0.043
yearofbirth -0.011 -0.0039 -0.02
0.017 0.0058 0.019
male -0.095 -0.032 -0.00069
0.23 0.077 0.24
semester -0.015 -0.0052 -0.031
0.018 0.0063 0.018
game -0.0063 -0.0033 -0.19
0.19 0.067 0.2
econmajor -0.0076 -0.0016 -0.019
0.2 0.072 0.2
statistics -0.23 -0.081 -0.15
0.17 0.061 0.17
econometrics 0.3 0.11 0.39
0.24 0.084 0.24
height 0.014 0.0049 0.012
0.011 0.0037 0.01
conﬁdence 0.15* 0.054* 0.19*
0.066 0.023 0.08
WTA -0.032 -0.011 -0.047
0.06 0.021 0.06
Constant 0.16 -1.59 0.57*** -0.053 -0.15 -0.73
0.099 2.25 0.038 0.75 0.14 2.22
Observations 1,800 1,644 1,800 1,644 1,590 1,511
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, robust standard errors clustered at subjects' level
Table 2: Diﬀerences in consistency
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two months' time lag, PF-F : It is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from P-PF (p <0.001),
from P-P' (p =0.003), and from same condition (p <0.001). P-PF, with a time
lag of 10 minutes, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from P-P', also with a time lag of
10 minutes (p =0.573), but is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from same condition, which
has no time lag (p =0.021). The only comparison which is not diﬀerent across
time delays is P-P', with a time lag of 10 minutes, versus same condition, no
time lag, which are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p =0.625).
Surprisingly to us, the ident variable is not signiﬁcant. When evaluating sub-
jects' consistency, the fact whether the two decisions are made for one and the
same urn or for two diﬀerent urns does not matter. Hence, subjects do not
seem to treat diﬀerent urns diﬀerently when the information on the urn is kept
constant. In our experimental design, we spend considerable eﬀort to come up
with a comparison of physically identical urns.18 Our result on ident is impor-
tant for future experiments: The eﬀort to compare physically identical urns is
not necessary, as it suﬃces to use urns with the same information structure.
In model (2) we add sociodemographic measures (year of birth, being male,
number of semesters studied, having participated in a game theory or statistics
course, being an economics major and body height in cm.19 Furthermore, we
add the subjects risk preferences elicited by the HL task (HL_missing carries
a 1 if HL is missing or non-monotonic preferences were returned).20 Neither of
these variables is signiﬁcant, nor do they change the signiﬁcant results of our
condition variables.
Finally, we add the variables conﬁdence and WTA. Both of them are the conﬁ-
dence measures introduced in section 3.1. Measuring consistency between two
urns generates data on four bets. The variables reported are the averages over
these four bets. In the results we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect of the
conﬁdence variable in all models. Therefore, subjects who show higher levels
of conﬁdence in their choices are also more likely to show consistent behavior.
However, we do not detect a relevant eﬀect for the WTA variable. It is insignif-
icant in all models. This could be due to fact that this question is of higher
complexity. As a robustness check, we repeat model (1) and (2) in an OLS
18Note that, had we known this result in advance, we could have used a considerably shorter
design.
19Since Dohmen et al. (2011) ﬁnd correlations between height, age and risk aversion, this
raises the issue of multicolinearity. By testing the variance inﬂation factors do not detect
such eﬀects in any model.
20For the HL task we take the ﬁrst row a subject switches from option A to B. Lower values
represent a higher risk tolerance.
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speciﬁcation, see model (3) and (4). The results stay qualitatively unchanged.
Overall, whenever the time lag between two compared choice conditions is diﬀer-
ent, also the level of consistency is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent - with one exception,
P-P' versus same condition. And when the time lag between two compared
conditions is similar, also consistency is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. This shows
nicely how consistency depends on the time lag between decisions, even when
the amount of time passed is only 10 minutes.
Since time diﬀerences are a driving force behind diﬀerent levels of consistency,
we look into the eﬀect of being able to recall past decisions. To measure recall,
we asked subjects in the main experiment to recall their decision on that Ells-
berg urn in choice condition PF, which was selected to be paid in the January
session. In single session no such question was asked as we did not reinvite
subjects. Subjects did have an incentive to recall their own decisions, since
this allowed them to verify their payment in the Janaury session. If a subject
correctly recalled all past own decisions in the PF condition, the variable re-
call takes the value 1, and 0 otherwise. In models (5) and (6) we test whether
subjects who recalled their previous decisions correctly diﬀer from those who
did not. To do so, we reduce the sample to observations from the main experi-
ment and add interaction terms of recall with all available comparisons.21 The
results show that subjects who are able to recall past own actions are more con-
sistent in condition P-F, with a two months' time lag, than those how are not.
Performing a Wald test for the PF-F dummy versus its interaction with recall
shows that the same holds true for decisions in this comparison (p <0.001). So,
for both consistency values with a two months' time lag, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of recall. In fact, subjects who do not recall their previous actions act
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from random (see footnote 17). What about consis-
tency levels with a time lag of 10 minutes (P-PF ) or with no time lag (same
condition)? While we see some diﬀerence in ﬁgure 4, the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant
(p =0.860/p =0.604). This is not surprising: Recall is measured over a time
period of two months. Recalling actions over 10 minutes must be considerably
easier, such that we would not expect a strong diﬀerence between groups here.
We can also test whether subjects who are able to correctly remember previous
choices are still aﬀected by the diﬀerent time lags. Interestingly, based on the
estimates in model (5), not a single diﬀerence across choice conditions is still
21Note that we do not control for P-P' as this comparison is only available for single session.
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signiﬁcant!22 That is, for those subjects who, after two months, still recall their
decisions, we do not detect a time eﬀect on consistency. Again, adding sociode-
mographics and risk aversion in model (6) does not alter these results in terms
of signiﬁcance.23
5 Robustness and further results
5.1 Consistency over four Ellsberg urns
In the above section we analyzed consistency based on pairwise comparisons of
urns. In the following we present a robustness check by applying a stricter mea-
sure for consistency. Here, we consider a subject to be consistent if the attitude
towards ambiguity is the same in all four decisions associated with immediate
payment, corresponding to the P and F decisions in the main experiment and
to P and P' in single session.24 This approach yields an alternative dependent
variable cons_all, consisting of one observation for each subject which is set to
1 if all choices are consistent and 0 otherwise. Overall, we ﬁnd a consistency
level of 40.8% in the main experiment and a level of 62.9% in the single session
treatment.
22Wald test p-values for the comparisons are 0.686 (P-F vs. P-PF ), 0.146 (P-F vs. PF-F ),
0.568 (P-F vs. same condition), 0.164 (PF-F vs. P-PF ), 0.152 (PF-F vs. same condition)
and 0.881 (P-PF vs. same condition).
23See table 7 in the appendix.
24We do not consider the PF data, as we do not have corresponding observations in single
session.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS PROBIT PROBIT
Dep. Var. cons_all cons_all cons_all cons_all cons_all cons_all
single session 0.56* 0.76* 0.22* 0.28* 1.06*** 1.32***
0.24 0.31 0.093 0.11 0.3 0.4
recall 0.81** 1.01***
0.27 0.3
reverse order 0.19 0.072 0.029
0.27 0.099 0.28
HL 0.96 0.32 1.14
0.66 0.23 0.72
HL_missing 0.095 0.03 0.11
0.071 0.025 0.079
yearofbirth -0.088* -0.025** -0.10**
0.039 0.0084 0.035
male 0.063 0.014 0.04
0.34 0.12 0.35
semester -0.065 -0.02 -0.076*
0.034 0.01 0.03
game 0.52 0.18 0.52
0.32 0.12 0.32
econmajor 0.14 0.056 0.15
0.32 0.12 0.33
statistics -0.16 -0.061 -0.071
0.27 0.099 0.28
econometrics -0.12 -0.044 -0.14
0.39 0.14 0.39
height 0.017 0.0066 0.022
0.018 0.0065 0.018
Constant -0.23 3.88 0.41*** 1.26 -0.73*** 3.91
0.13 4.62 0.049 1.15 0.21 4.17
Observations 138 137 138 137 138 137
R-squared 0.037 0.141
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, robust standard errors clustered at subjects' level
Table 3: Consistency over four urns
In table 3, we present estimates from diﬀerent models using cons_all as depen-
dent variable and including controls similiar to the analysis in section 4.3. In
line with the ﬁndings in section 4.3, we ﬁnd a higher level of consistency in the
single session treatment as the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in all six models shows.
This proves that, also under the stricter speciﬁcation, consistency decreases
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when decisions are separated by a longer time interval.
We argued in the above section that consistency is not aﬀect by time for sub-
jects that remember their decisions. Here, we tackle this issue in model (5) and
(6) by including the subject's ability to correctly recall previous decisions. We
detect a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect (at 1% in model (5) and 0.1% in model (6)) in
the expected direction. Again, subjects recalling their decisions are more likely
to be consistent. Additionally, a Wald test reveals that the single session vari-
able is not statistically diﬀerent from the recall variable (p =0.36). This shows
that subjects in the main experiment that are able to remember past decisions
are as consistent over two months as the average subject is in a setting with a
delay of 10 minutes only.
As a further result these models bring up a mild age eﬀect. All models including
the yearofbirth variable show a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the 5%-level. Younger
subjects are less likely to be consistent. When computing the marginal eﬀects
(p =0.017 for model 2), the probability of being consistent decreases for every
year by 3.2%. Restrictively, the age variation is quite small since we observe
95% students in our sample. Nonetheless, the eﬀect is a pure age eﬀect as we
control for the seniority at university with the semester variable. Similar to the
models in table 2, reverse order and the risk preferences (HL) have no eﬀect on
consistency.
To sum up, this robustness check bolsters the results from section 4.3. With
an even stricter measure of consistency, we conﬁrm both the general time ef-
fect on consistency and the mitigating role of the individual recall capacity.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd a slightly positive age eﬀect on consistency.
5.2 Ambiguity preferences
Preferences in aggregate After having analyzed the individual consistency
of preferences, we take a look at the overall distributions of ambiguity attitudes
in the diﬀerent choice conditions. As ﬁgure 6 shows, the distribution of ambi-
guity attitudes is broadly similar over the diﬀerent choice conditions. Although
we ﬁnd that time has an eﬀect on the individual consistency above, this does
not imply that the preferences change in the aggregate. Observe, however, that
ﬁnding diﬀerences over a period of two months would suggest an extreme eﬀect
of aging.
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Figure 6: Ambiguity preferences over choice conditions
Ambiguity preferences and demographics In table 4 we present six pro-
bit models for the diﬀerent types of ambiguity preferences. The underlying data
is organized and stacked by urns and we consider data from the main experi-
ment only. Depending on the retention to the January sessions, each subject
decides on up to six urns corresponding to up to six observations for each sub-
ject in the dataset. The models are computed with standard errors clustered
on the subject level to control for multiple observations.
The dependent variable is a binary variable that carries a one if the subject
shows the respective preference in the urn. Model (1) and (4) investigate am-
biguity averse (AA), (2) and (5) ambiguity neutral (AN ) and (3) and (6) am-
biguity loving (AL) attitudes.
For the explanatory part we include two diﬀerent sets of variables. First, in
order to evaluate the time eﬀects on the ambiguity attitudes, we include binary
variables to control for the choice conditions (PF, F ). The omitted category is
P. While model (1) to (3) are probit models, models (4) to (6) are estimated
by OLS as a robustness check. Second, similiar to regressions in the previous
section, we include several personal control variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P omitted PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS OLS
Dep. Var. AA AN AL AA AN AL
PF -0.25* 0.17 0.19 -0.088* 0.061 0.026
0.11 0.1 0.19 0.04 0.036 0.027
F -0.23 0.15 0.23 -0.081 0.05 0.031
0.15 0.15 0.2 0.053 0.053 0.031
HL 0.14* -0.13* -0.0001 0.050* -0.049* -0.001
0.061 0.053 0.065 0.021 0.019 0.012
HL_missing 0.46 -0.81 0.5 0.17 -0.3 0.13
0.55 0.54 0.52 0.19 0.21 0.12
reverse order 0.29 -0.16 -0.33 0.11 -0.057 -0.051
0.19 0.19 0.19 0.07 0.068 0.029
time 0.017 -0.01 -0.014 0.0057 -0.0031 -0.0025
0.028 0.025 0.03 0.01 0.0091 0.0045
yearofbirth -0.01 -0.001 0.13* -0.0037 -0.0004 0.0041
0.015 0.012 0.054 0.0055 0.0046 0.0022
male -0.17 0.046 0.31 -0.058 0.014 0.045
0.27 0.26 0.29 0.098 0.092 0.046
semester -0.004 -0.012 0.10* -0.0014 -0.0045 0.0059
0.021 0.022 0.039 0.008 0.0078 0.0043
game 0.074 0.012 -0.33 0.02 0.0024 -0.022
0.26 0.24 0.28 0.096 0.09 0.042
econmajor -0.41 0.33 0.23 -0.14 0.12 0.022
0.26 0.23 0.28 0.096 0.088 0.044
statistics 0.079 -0.087 0.07 0.034 -0.033 -0.0005
0.21 0.21 0.2 0.078 0.077 0.033
econometrics 0.042 -0.02 0.019 0.015 -0.0077 -0.0074
0.34 0.31 0.33 0.13 0.12 0.051
height 0.024 -0.011 -0.035* 0.0086 -0.0039 -0.0047*
0.012 0.012 0.014 0.0045 0.0044 0.002
conﬁdence 0.1 -0.066 -0.044 0.037 -0.023 -0.013
0.095 0.092 0.099 0.035 0.034 0.02
WTA -0.006 0.016 -0.0028 -0.0009 0.006 -0.0051
0.087 0.083 0.089 0.031 0.031 0.016
Constant -4.17 2.62 -7.17 -1 1.44 0.56
2.46 2.32 5.62 0.85 0.8 0.32
Observations 607 607 607 607 607 607
R-squared 0.117 0.062 0.07
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, robust standard errors clustered at subjects' level
Table 4: Ambiguity attitudes and demographics
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As ﬁgure 6 suggests, there are no large eﬀects on the distribution of ambiguity
attitudes. When considering the tests in the regressions in model (1) and model
(4) in table 4, we ﬁnd a mild reduction of ambiguity aversion in PF. This ﬁnding
is in line with Onay et al. (2012).
We detect mild correlations between demographics and ambiguity preferences
while time preferences do not have a signiﬁcant impact. Furthermore, the mod-
els show a correlation between the risk task and ambiguity attitudes. For am-
biguity averse choices we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation with risk averse behavior
whereas ambiguity neutral choices are positively associated with risk tolerance.
For ambiguity lovers we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects. In general, these results
coincide with the ﬁndings of Lauriola and Levin (2001) and Chakravarty and
Roy (2008) who ﬁnd ambiguity and risk aversion positively associated. How-
ever, this relationship is not undisputed since Di Mauro and Maﬃoletti (2004)
ﬁnd only a low correlation and Cohen et al. (1985) no relationship at all. The
time coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant in all models.
5.3 Consistency of uncertainty: Risk and ambiguity
Above, we argue that the ability to recall choices correlates with consistent
ambiguity preferences. In the following we will explore two questions: First,
whether the ability to recall also aﬀects consistency in risk preferences. Second,
whether having consistent ambiguity attitudes correlates with consistent risk
preferences.
In the experiment, we elicited risk preferences in the P and the F session.
Therefore we are able to investigate the P-F consistency for ambiguity as well
as for risk preferences.
For this analysis, we construct a binary variable that carries a one if a subject is
consistent between both risk tasks (cons_HL). Hence, we consider a subject to
be consistent, if the deviation in rows switching from option A to B between the
two tasks is smaller or equal than one. Using this variable, we ﬁnd a consistency
level of 85% between the two risk tasks.25 This is considerably higher compared
to the 57% we ﬁnd for ambiguity preferences for (P-F, see ﬁgure 4).26
25By using a structural maximum likelihood model (Harrison 2006) we do not ﬁnd signif-
icant diﬀerences in CRRA coeﬃcients (assuming u(x) = xα) between November (0.88) and
January (0.89) in aggregate. This is in line with Andersen et al. (2008).
26The results do not change change qualitatively or in signiﬁcance if we use an alternative
measure of consistency for risk preferences: A subject is considered to be consistent when
showing risk averse, neutral or loving preferences in both HL tasks. Here we ﬁnd a consistency
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS
Dep. Var. cons_HL cons_HL cons_HL cons_HL
consistent -0.014 -0.097 -0.004 -0.0046
0.44 0.5 0.11 0.12
recall 0.22 0.32 0.053 0.07
0.34 0.4 0.084 0.091
reverse order -0.062 -0.013
0.36 0.083
yearofbirth 0.0091 0.0032
0.036 0.01
male 0.086 0.03
0.44 0.11
semester -0.0076 -0.00085
0.043 0.012
game -0.66 -0.15
0.42 0.11
econmajor 0.12 -0.014
0.37 0.1
statistics -0.39 -0.093
0.36 0.091
econometrics 1.21 0.27
0.67 0.14
height -0.0091 -0.0022
0.028 0.0071
conﬁdence 0.032 0.007
0.23 0.048
WTA -0.33 -0.061
0.2 0.045
Constant 0.91** 2.82 0.82*** 1.11
0.3 5.11 0.077 1.37
Observations 91 90 91 90
R-squared 0.005 0.099
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001
robust standard errors clustered at subjects' level
Table 5: Ambiguity attitudes and demographics
In table 5 we present two binary choice models investigating the relationship
between the consistency in risk and ambiguity preferences. The dependent vari-
able measures the consistency in risk preferences over the choice conditions P
and F (cons_HL).27 The independent variable of interest is our previous mea-
sure for consistent ambiguity preferences (consistent). Additionally, model (1)
controls for subjects who remember their decision in the PF urn whereas model
level of 87.9%.
27We restrict the analysis to P-F since we do not observe a HL decision with a delayed
payment. However, a comparable setting is tested by Noussair and Wu (2006) who ﬁnd that
subjects are less averse toward future risks.
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(2) includes a set of demographic variables.28 Model (3) and (4) are robustness
checks estimated by OLS. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between the con-
sistency of risk and ambiguity preferences since consistent is insigniﬁcant. The
fact that subjects remember their decision in the ambiguity task has also no
eﬀect on the consistency of risk preferences as recall is signiﬁcant.
Hence, although we ﬁnd a correlation between risk and ambiguity preferences,
we do not ﬁnd a correlation in the corresponding levels of consistency.
5.4 Order eﬀects
urn_nb_4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
omitted PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS OLS
Dep. Var. AA AN AL AA AN AL
urn_nb_1 0.01 0.09 -0.23 0.004 0.033 -0.037
0.12 0.12 0.21 0.049 0.045 0.034
urn_nb_2 -0.023 0.15 -0.29 -0.0092 0.055 -0.046
0.12 0.11 0.21 0.049 0.042 0.033
urn_nb_3 -0.082 0.042 0.087 -0.032 0.015 0.017
0.09 0.099 0.16 0.036 0.036 0.032
Constant 0.15 -0.44*** -1.23*** 0.56*** 0.33*** 0.11***
0.12 0.12 0.16 -.048 0.045 0.03
Observations 438 438 438 438 438 438
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.008
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, robust standard errors clustered at subjects' level
Table 6: Order eﬀects on multiple elicitations
A concern when eliciting multiple urns per subject is that subjects decide may
diﬀerently in repeated tasks. The models in table 6 investigate whether the
sequence in which urns are presented does aﬀect the subjects ambiguity pref-
erence. The independent variables consist of dummy variables indicating the
position in the sequence of presentation regardless of the choice condition. For
example, urn_nb_1 carries a one for the ﬁrst urn in the experiment and a zero
otherwise. The dependent variables are also on a binary scale and show a one
if the subject's preference is ambiguity averse (model 1), neutral (model 2) or
loving (model 3). While models (1) to (3) are probit estimations, (4) to (6) are
OLS models which are presented for robustness. The results show that there
are no signiﬁcant and systematic order eﬀects. This conﬁrms that we did not
28See section 4.3 for the description
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miss out relevant information when focusing on choice conditions instead of urn
order in our main analysis.29
6 Conclusion
In an experiment designed to test the stability of subjects' ambiguity pref-
erences, we ﬁnd that the consistency of choices is well above the benchmark
of random behavior. Consistency decreases as the time lag between choices
increases, from 79% for back-to-back choices to 57% for two months. The de-
crease in consistency over time is mitigated by subjects' ability to recall their
previous choices. For subjects who successfully recall their previous choices,
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between longer and shorter time lags. Overall,
the consistency results leave a mixed picture: Subjects are consistent to some
degree, but not fully. A large amount of individual inconsistency can remain
hidden when only aggregate results are taken into account.
Apart from the observed levels of consistent choice, we were also interested in
drivers of stability. Here, we could reject our initial concern that the compari-
son across diﬀerent urns might introduce a bias: Subjects' consistency over the
same urn is not diﬀerent from the consistency for physically not identical urns.
This suggests that it is acceptable to forgo the eﬀort of constructing experiments
where one and the same urn is used multiple times in an incentive compatible
way. Moreover, we could identify two correlates of stability. One is self-reported
conﬁdence in the choice which turned out to be a signiﬁcant predictor of sta-
bility. Hence, including a question like the one used in our experiment might
be helpful in predicting individual behavior. Second, subjects who recall their
behavior are associated with more consistent behavior, in particular as the time
span increases. These subjects might deliberately chose consistent with their
previous choices, either to appear consistent, or to avoid having to make up their
minds again. However, since we only ﬁnd a correlation, other causal eﬀects are
also possible. The subjects using easy to remember heuristics (Gigerenzer and
Gaissmaier 2011) could lead to a reverse direction of causality: Subjects are
consistent because they use the same heuristic at both times. And they are
able to recall their previous decisions not because they remember the action,
but remember using the same heuristic before.
29In an alternative test we include urn_nb in the models of table 4. While losing the
January observations in these regressions we again do not ﬁnd an order eﬀect.
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A Appendix: Tables
P-values for Wald tests for joint signiﬁcance for models in table 2
H0: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
samecndtn=PF-F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.000
samecndtn=P-PF 0.002 0.0017 0.045 0.034 0.17 0.12
PF-F=P-PF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-P'=PF-F 0.003 0.007 0.0017 0.0047
P-P'=P-PF 0.57 0.63 0.72 0.87
P-P'=samecndtn 0.62 0.59 0.54 0.4
recall P-F=recall P-PF 0.69 0.73
recall P-F=recall PF-F 0.15 0.087
recall P-F=recall samesit 0.57 0.56
recall P-F=recall P-PF 0.16 0.12
recall PF-F=recall samecndtn 0.88 0.099
recall P-PF=recall samecndtn 0.000 0.8
P_PF=recall P-PF 0.86 0.73
PF_F=recall PF-F 0.000 0.000
samecndtn=recall samecndtn 0.6 0.64
Table 7: Consistency: Wald tests on joint signiﬁcance
B Pictures for credibility
Urn content with time identiﬁer Presentation of urns
Table 8: Pictures of urns
C Instructions
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 1 
Instructions –November session 
 
 
Instructions – First experimental session 
 
 
 
Dear participant, 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Your participation in this experiment supports our 
scientific work. At the same time, your actions allow you to earn money. 
Scientifically responsible for this experiment are Peter Dürsch, Daniel Römer, and 
Benjamin Roth (Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, Heidelberg University). 
 
 
Course of action of the experiment 
 
Firstly, please turn off your mobile phone, and keep it off during the entire experiment. 
Do not talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please stay calm and raise 
a hand. Someone of our experimental staff will answer your question. 
 
Your payoff depends on the choices you make during the experiment.  
 
The experiment consists of two experimental sessions. The first session is taking 
place today. The second session is going to take place in January 2013. For the 
experiment it is essential that you participate in both sessions.  
 
Today’s session consists of five parts. These five parts are labeled in the instructions 
as “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, and “E”. The instructions at hand explain today’s entire 
experimental session, and are identical for all participants. The experiment starts with 
part A, then part B, and part C, followed by part D. E is the last part. You can keep the 
instructions, and read them during the experiment, at any time.  
 
 
 2 
Part A 
 
 
In part A, you need to make choices for two different boxes („Box 1“ and „Box 2“). Both 
boxes are located in this room, and each of them contains 30 marbles. Each box 
contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 marbles are either blue, or green, in 
an arbitrary proportion.  
 
We will hand out decision sheets A. On decision sheet A you have to make two 
choices for each of the boxes. Each choice determines your payoff and depends on 
the marble’s color that will be drawn from the corresponding box. 
 
You make your choices for both boxes. You are paid-off for the choices you made for 
one box. In the end of this experimental session, a flip of a coin decides which of the 
two boxes will be considered for today’s session’s payoff. Afterwards, two independent 
draws (the marble is put back into the box after each draw) determine your individual 
payoff according to your choices you made on decision sheet A. To do so, first of all, 
one marble will be drawn, its color will be notated, and afterwards, the marble will be 
put back into the box. For the second draw this procedure will be repeated. The other 
box will be used in part B.  
  
 3 
Part B 
 
 
Again, you have to make your choices for two boxes (“Box 3” and “Box 4”). Box 3 is 
the same box from part A which was not considered for the determination of the 
payoffs. Box 4 is a new box. Both boxes are located in this room, and each of them 
contains 30 marbles. Each box contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 
marbles are either blue, or green, in an arbitrary proportion.  
 
We will hand out decision sheet B. On decision sheet B you have to make two choices 
for each of the boxes. Each choice determines your payoff and depends on the 
marble’s color that will be drawn from the corresponding box. 
 
You make your choices for both boxes. You are paid-off for the choices you made for 
one box. In the end of this experimental session, a flip of a coin decides which of the 
two boxes will be considered for today’s session’s payoff. Please be aware of that, 
contrary to part A, the draws from this box, as well as the corresponding payoff 
will take place in the second experimental session in January 2013. In the second 
experimental session in January 2013, two independent draws (the marble is put back 
into the box after each draw) determine your individual payoff according to your 
choices you made on decision sheet B. To do so, in January, one marble will be 
drawn, its color will be notated, and afterwards, the marble will be put back into the 
box. For the second draw this procedure will be repeated.  
 
Note: The box which was determined for the coming drawing in January will remain 
unchanged. For this purpose, we will take a picture of the content of the box, together 
with an identifier for this session, in this room, right before the drawing. This picture will 
be sent to you via e-mail after the second session in January. In the January session 
we will take a picture of the content of the box, too, such that you will have the 
possibility to check that the content of the box has been remained unchanged.  
 4 
Part C 
 
 
We will hand out decision sheet C. On decision sheet C you will find the following 
table. In this table, we ask you for ten choices. In each row you have two alternatives: 
Option A and Option B. You have to decide for one alternative in each row (Option A 
or Option B). 
 
Example: In the first row you can decide between two options.  
 If you choose Option A, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
2.00€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 1.60€. 
 
 If you choose Option B, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
3.85€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 0.10€. 
 
 (This is just an example table. You do not need to cross anything!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
Your actual payoff in part C will be determined in the end of this experiment. Which 
one of the ten rows determines the payoff will be determined by chance (rolling a ten-
sided dice). For this row, only the option you have chosen by crossing will be of 
relevance (Option A or Option B). The ten-sided dice will be rolled one further time in 
order to determine whether the amount highlighted in gray will be paid out, or the 
amount in the white area.  
 
Example: If the dice indicates a 1 after the first rolling, this means that row 1 is 
determined. Consider therefore the first row in the table. If the dice indicates again a 
1 after the second rolling, this means that the amount highlighted in gray (not the white 
area) will be paid out. Hence, you will receive 2€ if you have crossed Option A, and 
3.85€ if you have crossed Option B. If the dice had indicated a number between 2 and 
10 after the second rolling, you would have received 1.60€ for Option A and 0.10€ for 
Option B.  
  
 5 
Part D 
 
 
We will hand out decision sheet D. On decision sheet D you will find the following 
table. In this table, we ask you for ten choices. In each row you have two alternatives: 
Option A and Option B. You have to decide for one alternative in each row (Option A 
or Option B). 
 
Example: In the second row you can decide between the following two options.  
 
 If you choose Option A, you will receive a payoff of 2.00€ in today’s session. 
 If you choose Option B, you will receive a payoff of 2.05€ in the next session in 
January.  
 
(This is just an example table. You do not need to cross anything!) 
 Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff today A or B 
Payoff 
in January 
1 2,00 € o  o 2,00 € 
2 2,00 € o  o 2,05 € 
3 2,00 € o  o 2,10 € 
4 2,00 € o  o 2,15 € 
5 2,00 € o  o 2,20 € 
6 2,00 € o  o 2,30 € 
7 2,00 € o  o 2,40 € 
8 2,00 € o  o 2,60 € 
9 2,00 € o  o 2,80 € 
10 2,00 € o  o 3,00 € 
 
Your actual payoff in part D will be determined in the end of this experiment. Which 
one of the ten rows determines the payoff will be determined by chance (rolling a ten-
sided dice). For this row, only the option you have chosen by crossing will be of 
relevance (Option A or Option B). 
Example: If the dice indicates a 2, this means that row 2 is determined. Consider 
therefore the second row in the table. You will receive 2€ today if you have crossed 
option A, or 2.05€ in January if you have crossed option B.  
  
 6 
Part E. 
 
 
We will hand out a questionnaire. Please state some general information on this 
questionnaire.  
 
  
 7 
Total payment 
 
 
In the end of today’s session, you will receive the sum of your payoffs from part A, C, 
and if so from part D. You will receive your payoff in cash and in private. Please 
remain patient. The distribution the payoffs can take some time. 
 
Please wait until we announce your number and then step forward. Please remain 
calm and do not talk to other participants. 
 
The drawings and payoff of part B will take place in the second experimental session 
in January 2013. 
Decision sheet A    Seat number: ________ 
 
 
 
BOX 1 
 
 
Choice 1.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
  │−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
Choice 1.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
BOX 2 
 
 
Choice 2.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
 
Choice 2.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
Decision sheet B    Seat number: ________ 
 
 
BOX 3 
 
 
Choice 3.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
 
Choice 3.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
BOX 4 
 
 
Choice 4.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
Choice 4.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
Decision sheet C  Seat number: ________ 
 
 
 
Below, you will find a table. We ask you for ten choices in this table. In each row of 
this table you have to decide between two alternatives: Option A and Option B. You 
have to decide for one alternative in each row (Option A or Option B). 
 
 
TABLE (Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
Decision sheet D  Seat number: ________ 
 
 
 
Below, you will find a table. We ask you for ten choices in this table. In each row of 
this table you have to decide between two alternatives: Option A and Option B. You 
have to decide for one alternative in each row (Option A or Option B). 
 
TABLE (Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
 Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff today A or B 
Payoff 
in January 
1 2,00 € o  o 2,00 € 
2 2,00 € o  o 2,05 € 
3 2,00 € o  o 2,10 € 
4 2,00 € o  o 2,15 € 
5 2,00 € o  o 2,20 € 
6 2,00 € o  o 2,30 € 
7 2,00 € o  o 2,40 € 
8 2,00 € o  o 2,60 € 
9 2,00 € o  o 2,80 € 
10 2,00 € o  o 3,00 € 
Questionnaire E     Seat number: ________ 
 
 
 
Year of birth:  ________ 
Sex:   ○ female  ○ male 
 
Studies  
 currently not studying 
 currently studying  
Field of study:  ________ 
Semester:   ________ 
 
Specific subjects 
I took part in lectures in the following subjects: 
 Game Theory 
 Statistics 
 Econometrics 
 
Height: 
Height in cm:   ________ 
 
 1 
Instructions –January session 
 
 
Instructions – Second experimental session 
 
 
 
Dear participant, 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Your participation in this experiment supports our 
scientific work. At the same time, your actions allow you to earn money. 
Scientifically responsible for this experiment are Peter Dürsch, Daniel Römer, and 
Benjamin Roth (Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, Heidelberg University). 
 
 
Course of action of the experiment 
 
Please turn off your mobile phone, and keep it off during the entire experiment. Do not 
talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please stay calm and raise a 
hand. Someone of our experimental staff will answer your question. 
 
Your payoff depends on the choices you make during the experiment.  
 
The experiment consists of two experimental sessions. The first session is took place 
in November 2012. Today the second session takes place. 
 
Today’s session consists of five parts. These five parts are labeled in the instructions 
as “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, and “E”. The instructions at hand explain today’s entire 
experimental session, and are identical for all participants. The experiment starts with 
part A, then part B, and part C, followed by part D. E is the last part. You can keep the 
instructions, and read them during the experiment, at any time.  
 
 
 2 
Part A 
 
 
In part A, you have to make choices for two different boxes („Box 5“ and „Box 6“). Both 
boxes are located in this room, and each of them contains 30 marbles. Each box 
contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 marbles are either blue, or green, in 
an arbitrary proportion.  
 
Please note: Box 5 is the box for which you have already made a decision in the first 
session but was not chosen for payment. Box 6 is new. 
 
We will hand out decision sheet A. On decision sheet A you have to make two choices 
for each of the boxes. Each choice determines your payoff and depends on the 
marble’s color that will be drawn from the corresponding box. 
 
You make your choices for both boxes. You are paid-off for the choices you made for 
one box. A flip of a coin decides which of the two boxes will be considered for today’s 
session’s payoff. Afterwards, two independent draws (the marble is put back into the 
box after each draw) determine your individual payoff according to your choices you 
made on the decision sheet. To do so, first of all, one marble will be drawn, its color 
will be notated, and afterwards, the marble will be put back into the box.  
Note: The content of box 5 from the last session stayed unchanged. For this purpose, 
we will take a picture of the content of the box, together with an identifier for this 
session, in this room, right before the drawing. This picture will be sent to you via e-
mail after the last session (presumably on 25.02.2013) such that you will have the 
possibility to check that the content of the box has been remained unchanged. 
  
 3 
Part B. 
 
 
Please answer all questions on the questionnaire. For each correct answer we pay 
€0.25 
 
 
Part C. 
 
 
Please answer all questions on the questionnaire. For each correct answer we pay 
€0.25 
 
 
Part D. 
 
 
We will hand out a questionnaire. Please state some general information on this 
questionnaire.  
  
 4 
 
Part E 
 
 
We will hand out decision sheet C. On decision sheet C you will find the following 
table. In this table, we ask you for ten choices. In each row you have two alternatives: 
Option A and Option B. You have to decide for one alternative in each row (Option A 
or Option B). 
 
Example: In the first row you can decide between two options.  
 If you choose Option A, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
2.00€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 1.60€. 
 
 If you choose Option B, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
3.85€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 0.10€. 
 
 (This is just an example table. You do not need to cross anything!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
Your actual payoff in part C will be determined in the end of this experiment. Which 
one of the ten rows determines the payoff will be determined by chance (rolling a ten-
sided dice). For this row, only the option you have chosen by crossing will be of 
relevance (Option A or Option B). The ten-sided dice will be rolled one further time in 
order to determine whether the amount highlighted in gray will be paid out, or the 
amount in the white area.  
 
Example: If the dice indicates a 1 after the first rolling, this means that row 1 is 
determined. Consider therefore the first row in the table. If the dice indicates again a 
1 after the second rolling, this means that the amount highlighted in gray (not the white 
area) will be paid out. Hence, you will receive 2€ if you have crossed Option A, and 
3.85€ if you have crossed Option B. If the dice had indicated a number between 2 and 
10 after the second rolling, you would have received 1.60€ for Option A and 0.10€ for 
Option B.  
  
 5 
Part E. 
 
 
We will hand out a questionnaire. Please state some general information on this 
questionnaire.  
 
  
 6 
Total payment 
 
 
At the end of today’s session, you will receive the sum of your payoffs from part A, B 
C, D and if so from part E. We also pay you a show-up fee of € 4 for today’s session. 
The payment will be cash and in private. Please remain patient since payment can 
take some time. 
 
Please wait until we announce your number and then step forward. Please remain 
calm and do not talk to other participants. 
Decision sheet A    Seat number: ________ 
 
 
 
BOX 5 
 
 
Choice 5.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
  │−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
Choice 5.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
BOX 6 
 
 
Choice 6.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
 
Choice 6.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
Questionnaire B     Seat number: ________ 
 
 
In this part you will receive 0.25€ for each right answer. 
 
Assume that a participant has made the following choices for a bag: 
 
 
 
Assume that in the corresponding bag are exactly 10 yellow marbles, 5 blue 
marbles, and 15 green marbles. 
 
Please state how many marbles have to be in the bag such that the participant’s 
payoff is 2€. 
 
For the draw for Choice 1: 
 
In the bag are ______ marbles such that the payoff is 2€. 
In the bag are ______ marbles such that the payoff is not 2€. 
 
 
For the draw for Choice 2: 
 
In the bag are ______ marbles such that the payoff is 2€.  
In the bag are ______ marbles such that the payoff is not 2€. 
Choice 1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
 X  You will receive 2€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 2€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
Choice 2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
 X  You will receive 2€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 2€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
Questionnaire C     Seat number: ________ 
 
The following questions refer to the first experimental session in November. During 
the first session you have made decisions in two boxes from which on is paid out 
today. The other was not chosen for payment. For this box you have made a decision 
today (box 5). 
 
The following questionnaire will evaluate whether you are able to recall your 
decisions on these two boxes. 
 
Every correct answer pays €0.25. 
 
A. The box that was chosen for payment today in the first session. 
 
Choice A.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
Choice A.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
Hoe confident are you with your recall in the above decisions? 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
 
B. The box that was not chosen for payment. (Box 5 of today’s session) 
 
 
Choice B.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
Choice B.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
Hoe confident are you with your recall in the above decisions? 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
Questionnaire D     Seat number: ________ 
 
 
Additional Questions on the Boxes 
 
 
Remember: All boxes contain 30 marbles. 10 are yellow; the remaining 20 are either 
blue or green, in an arbitrary mix. 
 
1. On box 5 and 6, have you made the same decisions? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
 
2. Why do have decided differently? 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
3. Do you think box 5 and 6 are filled the same? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
 
 
4. How do you think is the share of blue and green marbles in box 5? 
 
 There are more blue than green marbles in box 5. 
 There are more green than blue marbles in box 5. 
 There are equally many blue and green marbles in box 5. 
 
 
5. How do you think is the share of blue and green marbles in box 6? 
 
 There are more blue than green marbles in box 6. 
 There are more green than blue marbles in box 6. 
 There are equally many blue and green marbles in box 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. You neither know the content of box 5 nor of box 6. Have treated the boxes 
differently? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
Explain why: 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7. Remember: In the first session you had to decide for boxes that were paid out in 
the future but also for boxes which were paid out immediately. For none of the boxes 
you have known the exact content. Have you treated the boxes differently? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
Explain why: 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. Remember: Today and in the first session you decided on boxes that were paid 
out in the same session. For none of the boxes you have known the exact content. 
Have you treated the boxes differently? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
Explain why: 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Decision sheet E  Seat number: ________ 
 
 
 
Below, you will find a table. We ask you for ten choices in this table. In each row of 
this table you have to decide between two alternatives: Option A and Option B. You 
have to decide for one alternative in each row (Option A or Option B). 
 
 
TABLE (Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
 
  1 
Instructions –Single session 
 
Instructions 
 
 
 
Dear participant, 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Your participation in this experiment supports our 
scientific work. At the same time, your actions allow you to earn money. 
Scientifically responsible for this experiment are Peter Dürsch, Daniel Römer, and 
Benjamin Roth (Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, Heidelberg University). 
 
 
 
Course of action of the experiment 
 
Please turn off your mobile phone, and keep it off during the entire experiment. Do not 
talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please stay calm and raise a 
hand. Someone of our experimental staff will answer your question. 
 
Your payoff depends on the choices you make during the experiment.  
 
Today’s session consists of five parts. These five parts are labeled in the instructions 
as “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, and “E”. The instructions at hand explain today’s entire 
experimental session, and are identical for all participants. The experiment starts with 
part A, then part B, and part C, followed by part D. E is the last part. You can keep the 
instructions, and read them during the experiment, at any time.  
 
 
In the following, we start with part A. 
  2 
Part A 
 
 
In part A, you need to make choices for two different linen bags („Bag 1“ and „Bag 2“). 
Both bags are located in this room, and each of them contains 30 marbles. Each bag 
contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 marbles are either blue, or green, in 
an arbitrary proportion.  
 
We will hand out decision sheet A. On decision sheet A you have to make two choices 
for each of the bags. Each choice determines your payoff and depends on the 
marble’s color that will be drawn from the corresponding bag. 
 
After recollecting the decision sheets, a flip of a coin decides which of the two bags will 
be considered for the payoff. In the end of the experiment, two independent draws 
from this bag (the marble is put back into the bag after each draw) determine your 
individual payoff according to your choices you made on decision sheet A. The other 
bag will be used in part B.  
 
 
Part B 
 
 
Again, you have to make your choices for two linen bags (“Bag 3” and “Bag 4”). Bag 3 
is the same bag from part A which was not considered for the determination of 
the payoffs. Bag 4 is a new bag. Both bags are located in this room, and each of 
them contains 30 marbles. Each box contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 
marbles are either blue, or green, in an arbitrary proportion.  
 
We will hand out decision sheet B. On decision sheet B you have to make two choices 
for each of the bags. Each choice determines your payoff and depends on the 
marble’s color that will be drawn from the corresponding bag. 
 
After recollecting the decision sheets, a flip of a coin decides which of the two bags will 
be considered for the payoff. In the end of the experiment, two independent draws 
from this bag (the marble is put back into the bag after each draw) determine your 
individual payoff according to your choices you made on decision sheet B. The other 
bag will not be used. 
  3 
Part C 
 
 
We will hand out decision sheet C. On decision sheet C you will find two times the 
following table. In each one of the tables, you have two alternatives: Option A and 
Option B. You have to decide for one alternative in each row (Option A or Option B). 
 
Example: In the first row you can decide between two options.  
 If you choose Option A, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
2.00€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 1.60€. 
 
 If you choose Option B, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
3.85€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 0.10€. 
 
 (This is just an example table. You do not need to cross anything!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
Your actual payoff in part C will be determined in the end of this experiment. The 
payoff will be either for Table 1 or Table 2. In the end of this experiment, a flip of a 
coin decides which table will be considered for the payoff. Which one of the ten rows 
of the considered table determines the payoff will be determined by chance (rolling a 
ten-sided dice). For this row, only the option you have chosen by crossing will be of 
relevance (Option A or Option B). The ten-sided dice will be rolled one further time in 
order to determine whether the amount highlighted in gray will be paid out, or the 
amount in the white area.  
Example: If the dice indicates a 1 after the first rolling, this means that row 1 is 
determined. Consider therefore the first row in the table. If the dice indicates again a 
1 after the second rolling, this means that the amount highlighted in gray (not the white 
area) will be paid out. Hence, you will receive 2€ if you have crossed Option A, and 
3.85€ if you have crossed Option B. If the dice had indicated a number between 2 and 
10 after the second rolling, you would have received 1.60€ for Option A and 0.10€ for 
Option B.  
  4 
Part D 
 
 
We will hand out a questionnaire. Please answer the questions on this questionnaire. 
For each right answer you receive 0.25€. 
 
 
Part E 
 
 
We will hand out a questionnaire. Please state some general information on this 
questionnaire.  
 
 
 
  5 
Total payment 
 
 
In the end of the experiment, you will receive the sum of your payoffs from part A, B, 
C, and D. You will receive your payoff in cash and in private. Please remain patient 
since distributing the payoffs can take some time. 
 
Please wait until we announce your number and then step forward. Please remain 
calm and do not talk to other participants.  
 
After the experiment, each participant has the opportunity to examine the bags. 
 
Decision sheet A    Seat number: ________ 
 
 
 
BAG 1 
 
 
Choice 1.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
  │−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
Choice 1.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
BAG 2 
 
 
Choice 2.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
 
Choice 2.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
Decision sheet B    Seat number: ________ 
 
 
BAG 3 
 
 
Choice 3.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
 
Choice 3.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
BAG 4 
 
 
Choice 4.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
 
 
Choice 4.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not at all confident to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not at all confident       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off accordingly to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, 
how much should we pay you such that you change your decision above?  
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
Questionnaire D     Seat number: ________ 
 
 
Additional assessment of the bag 
 
In this part you will receive 0.25€ for each right answer. 
 
Assume that a participant has made the following choices for a bag: 
 
 
 
Assume that in the corresponding bag are exactly 10 yellow marbles, 5 blue 
marbles, and 15 green marbles. 
 
Please state how many marbles have to be in the bag such that the participant’s 
payoff is 4€. 
 
For the draw for Choice 1: 
 
In the bag are ______ marbles such that the payoff is 4€. 
In the bag are ______ marbles such that the payoff is not 4€. 
 
 
For the draw for Choice 2: 
 
In the bag are ______ marbles such that the payoff is 4€.  
In the bag are ______ marbles such that the payoff is not 4€. 
Choice 1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
 X  You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
Choice 2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
 X  You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
Decision sheet C     Seat number: ________ 
 
 
Below, you will find Table 1 and Table 2. We ask you for ten choices in each table. In 
each row of this table you have to decide between two alternatives: Option A and 
Option B. You have to decide for one alternative in each row (Option A or Option 
B). 
 
TABLE 1(Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
TABLE 2(Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
Questionnaire E    Seat number: ________ 
 
 
 
Year of birth:  ________ 
Sex:   ○ female  ○ male 
 
Studies  
 currently not studying 
 currently studying  
Field of study:  ________ 
Semester:   ________ 
 
Specific subjects 
I took part in lectures in the following subjects: 
 Game Theory 
 Statistics 
 Econometrics 
 
Height: 
Height in cm:   ________ 
